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Abstract 
WebView is an essential component in Android and iOS. It 
enables applications to display content from on-line resources. It 
simplifies task of performing a network request, parsing the data 
and rendering it. WebView uses a number of APIs which can 
interact with the web contents inside WebView. In the current 
paper, Cross-site scripting attacks or XSS attacks specific to 
Android WebView are discussed.  Cross-site scripting (XSS) is 
a type of vulnerability commonly found in web applications. 
This vulnerability makes it possible for attackers to run 
malicious code into victim’s WebView, through HttpClient APIs. 
Using this malicious code, the attackers can steal the victim’s 
credentials, such as cookies. The access control policies (i.e., 
the same origin policy) employed by the browser to protect those 
credentials can be bypassed by exploiting the XSS vulnerability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many of the Android applications display web content 
and also interact with it. This is possible by exposing a 
web browser as a standalone component and embedding it 
in the application. Such a component is called as 
WebView.  It uses WebKit rendering engine to display 
web pages. It also enables developers to incorporate 
browser functionalities such as rendering, navigation etc. 
in the application.  
1.1 Introduction to WebView APIs 
There are two types of APIs in WebView, the Web-based 
APIs and the UI based APIs [2]. Web-based APIs are 
designed to interact with the web-contents inside the 
WebView. Examples of these APIs include loadURL, 
CookieManager.getCookie, etc. Attacks described in [1] 
target the Web-based APIs.  WebView is subclass of a 
more generic View class.  
 
View is the base class for widgets, which are used to 
create interactive UI components (buttons, text fields, etc).  
Therefore, WebView inherits the APIs of super class. 
Such APIs are UI-based APIs. Attacks describe in [2] 
target the UI based APIs.  WebView APIs are described in 
detail in section 2. 
1.2 Overview of the work and contribution 
In the current paper, Cross-site scripting attacks on 
android WebView are investigated. Such attacks can be 
modeled using the interaction of Web-based APIs with the 
HttpClient. Using the should Override Urlloading() hook, 
the loadURL method can be intercepted, and the cookies 
can be stolen from the user’s mobile. The scripts residing 
at the server can be run on the Android device and stolen 
cookies can be sent to the server through HttpGet and 
HttpPost APIs. The stealing of cookies may lead to several 
vulnerabilities such as Session Hijacking and 
impersonating the user through his cookies. The attacks 
may also result in stealing of sensitive information from 
the phone such as phone’s contacts. 
 
2. Web View APIs 
 
The package which provides tools for Android application 
to browse the web is android. webkit. The package 
contains number of classes and interfaces. The most 
important class of the package is the WebView. It enables 
the developer to embed a built-in Web browser as widget, 
for displaying HTML content and browsing the web. In 
addition to WebView, android. webkit provides several 
other classes such as CookieManager, 
CookieSyncManager, WebChromeClient, WebViewClient 
etc. Jointly, these classes expose many APIs to Android 
applications. Based on their purposes, these APIs can be 
divided into two main categories, the Web-based APIs 
and UI based APIs [2].  In the current paper, we focus 
only on the Web-based APIs and their interaction with 
HTTP client. The paper also focuses on APIs related to 
two classes, WebViewClient and CookieManager.  
2.1 Web-page related hooks 
Android applications can monitor the events that occurred 
within WebView. This is done through the hooks 
provided by the WebViewClient class. Once triggered, 
these hook functions can access the event information, 
and may change the consequence of the events. To use 
these hooks, Android applications should first create a 
WebViewClient object, and then tell WebView to invoke 
the hooks in this object, when the intended events have 
IJCSN  International Journal of Computer Science and Network, Vol 2, Issue 2, April 2013            2 
ISSN    (Online) : 2277-5420 
 
 
 
occurred inside WebView. WebViewClient has already 
implemented the default behavior basically doing nothing 
for all the hooks. If we want to change that, we can 
override the hook functions with our own implementation. 
This is described in the code fragment below: 
 
 
2.2 Cookie Manager 
HTTP cookie, commonly referred to as just "cookie" is a 
parcel of text sent back and forth between a web browser 
and the server it accesses. Without a cookie, a web server 
cannot distinguish between different users, or determine 
any relationship between sequential page visits made by 
the same user. The CookieManager class in Android is 
used to manage cookies used by application's WebView. 
This class provides a number of public methods such as 
getCookie, acceptCookie() etc. 
 
3. HttpClient APIs 
 
HttpClient Class is an interface for HTTP client. The 
most essential function of HttpClient is to execute HTTP 
methods. Execution of an HTTP method involves one or 
several HTTP request / HTTP response exchanges, 
usually handled internally by HttpClient. The user is 
expected to provide a request object to execute and 
HttpClient is expected to transmit the request to the target 
server return a corresponding response object, or throw an 
exception if execution was unsuccessful.  
     
 
 
As shown in the code above, DefaultHttpClient is the 
default implementation of the HttpClient interface. 
3.1 HttpRequest 
All Http Requests have a request line consisting of a 
method name, a request URI and a HTTP protocol version.  
HttpClient supports out of the box all HTTP methods 
GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, DELETE, TRACE and 
OPTIONS. There is a specific class for each method type: 
HttpGet, HttpHead, HttpPost, HttpPut, HttpDelete, 
HttpTrace, and HttpOptions. The Request-URI is a 
Uniform Resource identifier that identifies the resource 
upon which to apply the request. HTTP request URIs 
consists of a protocol scheme, host name, optional port, 
resource path, optional query, and optional fragment. The 
HttpPost request is show in the code fragment below: 
 
 
4. Attack Model 
Following are the assumptions made in order to launch 
attacks successfully: 
1. For the attacks described throughout the paper, the 
applications need to be granted with permission 
Android.permission.INTERNET. This permission is 
granted to 86.6% of free applications and 65 percent 
of paid applications [10].  Since this permission is 
granted to most of the applications, it is quite easy for 
the attacker to launch the attacks.  
2. The attacks described in the case study in Section 3.2 
needs to be granted with permission 
android.permission.READ_CONTACT. This 
permission is granted to 16.1% of free apps and 11% 
of paid apps [10].  Many of the free apps such as 
whatsApp are installed with this permission.  
3. The paper describes the vulnerabilities in the third 
party Android applications. The owner of the web 
contents inside WebView, and the developer of the 
app are not the same. Therefore, there is a potential 
threat from a malicious application. 
5. Cross-site scripting attacks 
Cross-site scripting (XSS) is a type of computer security 
vulnerability typically found in Web Applications. To 
protect the user’s environment from malicious code, 
browsers use a sand-boxing mechanism that limits a script 
to access only resources associated with its origin site. 
Unfortunately, these security mechanisms fail if a user 
unknowingly executes a malicious script from an 
intermediate, trusted site. In this case, the malicious script 
is granted full access to all resources (e.g. Authentication 
tokens and cookies) that belong to the trusted site. Such 
attacks are called cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. 
In the present work, Cross-site scripting attacks on 
Android WebView are investigated. By finding ways of 
executing malicious scripts through the third party 
malicious app on phone, an attacker can gain elevated 
access-privileges to sensitive page content, session cookies, 
and a variety of other information in the phone such as 
contacts. Cross-site scripting attacks in android are also 
investigated in [11]. The attacks described in [11] exploits 
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flaw in the Intent handling mechanism of the Android 
browser. In the current paper, cross-site scripting attacks 
specific to WebView are investigated.  
 
It has been pointed out by [9] that Android includes a 
number of mechanisms to reduce the scope of the 
potential issues by limiting the capability of WebView to 
the minimum functionality required by the application. 
addJavaScriptInterface() allows JavaScript to invoke 
operations that are normally reserved for Android 
applications. If un-trusted input is allowed, un-trusted 
JavaScript may be able to invoke Android methods.  Leo 
et al. have modeled JavaScript Injection attacks using 
WebView's loadUrl() API[1]. The loadUrl() API receives 
an argument of string type; if the string starts with 
“javascript:”, WebView will treat the entire string as 
JavaScript code, and execute it in the context of the web 
page that is currently displayed by the WebView 
component. This JavaScript code has the same privileges 
as that included in the web page. Essentially, the injected 
JavaScript code can manipulate the DOM tree and cookies 
of the page. In the present work, the possibility of 
launching a Cross-site Scripting attacks without using 
setJavascriptEnabled() API is investigated. The attacks 
can be modeled by executing the scripts residing at the 
server and sending the malicious content to server 
through Web-Service using HttpGet, HttpPost and 
HttpPut APIs. Such attacks result in cookie stealing, 
Session hijacking and impersonating user using stolen 
cookies. Each of these attacks is described in detail in the 
later sections.  
 
5.1 Stealing cookies from the victim's device 
The most common behavior of XSS attacks is to gather 
cookies.  Cookies are small text files that reside on a 
user's computer and store name-value pairs along with 
some metadata. Cookies are commonly used to store 
information intended to be persistent during a browser 
session or from session to session, such as session IDs, 
user preferences, or login information. The cookie 
specifications assume that only the domain that set the 
cookie will be able to access it.  
 
Attack Method: When the user runs the application 
through the WebView, Android applications can monitor 
the events occurred within WebView. We override the 
shouldOverrideUrlLoading hook, which is triggered by 
the navigation event, (when the user tries to navigate to 
another URL). Cookies can be gathered at every page 
navigation of the user using the method getCookie() from 
CookieManager class as shown in the code fragment 
below: 
 
Through HttpPost, malicious script can be run on the 
user's Android device, cookies and URL can be sent to 
any third party (i.e., the attacker's server), thus avoiding 
the same-origin policy or cookie protection mechanism.  
 
 
 
The attacker is now able get all the cookies and will be 
able to launch several attacks such a Session Hijacking 
and impersonating user using stolen cookies. The attacks 
described above are quite dangerous as the user sees only 
the trusted content and is not aware that his cookies are 
being stolen. The attack is shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Cookie Stealing 
 
Session Hijacking: Session hijacking is a method of 
taking over a Web user session by stealthily obtaining the 
session ID and gaining unauthorized access. The session 
ID is normally stored within a cookie or URL.  Once the 
user's session ID has been accessed, the attacker can 
masquerade as that user and do anything the user is 
authorized to do on the network. From the web server's 
point of view, a request from an attacker has the same 
authentication as the victim’s requests, thus the request is 
performed on behalf of the victim’s session. This usually 
results in the attacker being able to perform all normal 
web application functions with the same privileges of 
legitimate user (e.g. online bill pay, composing an email, 
etc.). 
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Impersonating user using stolen cookies: If a website 
uses cookies as session identifiers, attackers can 
impersonate users after stealing victim’s cookies. By 
stealing cookies of social networking sites, message 
boards or forums, the attacker can post a new message in 
the victim’s name delete the victim’s post or exploit 
user’s credentials without his consent.  
 
Implementation: To demonstrate the feasibility of the 
attacks, PHP script is used at the server side to process 
POST requests from the malicious application. The POST 
method transfers information through HTTP headers. 
$_POST associative array in PHP is used to access cookies 
sent from the Android device using POST. At the device 
side, the details of implementation are as follows: 
 
1. Load the url of the target site using webView.loadUrl 
2. Create WebViewClient object to invoke hooks in the 
object.  
3. With shouldOverrideUrlLoading hook, the host 
application gets a chance to take over the control 
when a new URL is about to be loaded in the current 
WebView.  
4. For each of the URL that is overloaded, cookies can 
be gathered using cookieManager.getCookie class.  
5. The cookies can be sent to the attacker's server using 
HTTPclient POST method.  
 
After the attacker gains access to the user's cookies, he 
can hijack the user's sessions or impersonate the user 
using the cookies. The feasibility of such attacks were 
verified using the open source PHP based message board 
called phorum[12]. When the user has logged into the 
message board through malicious application, using his 
username and password, the cookies from the device are 
sent through POST method to the attacker's server. The 
attacker can use the stolen cookies and login to the 
message board with victim's credentials. The attacker can 
access the data in victim's account and also impersonate 
the victim by posting content on victim's name. 
 
3.2 Accessing Sensitive information from the Android   
      Phone  
 
An XSS attack could also use vulnerabilities in android 
WebView to scrape useful information out of phone such 
as phone's contacts, email ids and phone numbers. The 
user is completely unaware of such attacks as the user 
views the content from trusted web-pages.  
 
 
 
Fig 2:  Stealing sensitive information from phone 
 
Case Study: In the following case study, a Cross-site 
scripting attack in which phone's contacts are sent to the 
attacker's server is demonstrated. Let us assume that the 
user installs Facebook app, which is one of the most 
popular third party app. The user views the Facebook 
login page in the WebView. The malicious application 
fetches the sensitive information from the phone such as 
user’s contact details, phone numbers, Email-id etc., and 
sends it to the attacker’s server through the HttpClient as 
shown in Figure 2. The attack is very easy to launch but 
difficult to detect.  The user is not aware of such attack as 
he views only the legitimate content.  
 
Implementation: To demonstrate the feasibility of the 
attack, a sample malicious Android application was 
developed. The details of the application are as follows:  
1. Load the url of the target site using webView.loadUrl. 
2. Sensitive information such as user's contacts can be 
sent to the attacker's server using HTTPclient POST 
method. User views only the legitimate content in his 
WebView and does not know that sensitive 
information is stolen. 
PHP scripts are used at the server side to process POST 
requests from the malicious application. 
  
6. Conclusion 
 
In the present work, Cross-site scripting attacks with 
respect to Android WebView and HttpClient are studied. 
Such type of attack results in stealing of cookies and other 
sensitive information such as contacts from the Android 
phone. They also result in Session Hijacking and 
impersonating user using stolen cookies. The attacks are a 
result of breach in the same origin policy of Android 
browsers. XSS attacks are easy to execute, but difficult to 
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detect and prevent. The future work will focus on building 
solutions to defend against the attacks on WebView. 
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